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Abstract
We analyse European Central Bank (ECB) policy by estimating a forward-looking, augmented Taylor rule
using expectations data. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the financial and sovereign debt crises on
ECB policy. We find the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA) rises when expected economic activity is strong. Regardless of the inflation measure, inflation is not associated with the EONIA. Using a recursive estimation and a Chow test, we identify a policy shift in December 2008. The more generally accepted
starting date of the crisis, August 2007, does not correspond to a statistically significant shift in the ECB
policy. Using December 2008 for a policy shift, general financial market sentiment, as measured by
VSTOXX, is not significant in explaining EONIA movements. The ECB’s response to a shock to economic
activity has been more moderate since the crises. However, the EONIA increases as Greek sovereign risk
rises, possibly from increasing demand for liquidity by banks.
Keywords: Taylor Rule, EONIA, ECB, Financial Crisis, Sovereign Debt Crisis

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interestrate setting process of the European Central Bank (ECB)
between January 1999 and May 2011 and more specifically its inter-bank interest-rate response to the recent
financial and sovereign debt crises. The magnitude of
the recent crises has led the Federal Reserve and ECB to
undertake unprecedented measures to mitigate the effects
of the crises [1]. For instance, the ECB relaxed its collateral rules by accepting Greek government bonds, despite
their credit-rating downgrade.
According to Article 127 of the Lisbon Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, the primary objective for the ECB is medium-term price stability.1 The
ECB’s Governing Council defines price stability as a
year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Con1

Formerly Article 105 (1) in the Maastricht Treaty.
Decisions are achieved by cross-checking two pillars: monetary analysis and economic analysis. Monetary analysis is based on the idea that
inflation is primarily an excess money phenomenon and the analysis
involves monitoring monetary conditions in the euro area. The second
pillar, “economic analysis” consists of reviewing a wide range of economic and financial indicators, such as overall output, fiscal policy,
wages, inflation forecasts, yield curve, exchange rate, business and
consumer surveys, and asset prices.
2

Copyright © 2011 SciRes.

sumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below, but close
to 2%. Given that monetary policy affects the economy
with lags, to maintain price stability, ECB acts in a forward-looking manner [2].2 ECB policy is tailored to the
changing economic landscape of the euro area and may
be altered according to economic shocks hitting the eurowide economy.
Since policy decisions at the ECB are often opaque
and the minutes from the policy meetings are not publicly available, estimating the ECB’s reaction function to
macroeconomic conditions should provide insight into its
behaviour. Numerous papers have estimated a Taylor
policy rule for the ECB, but many of these papers’ estimates are based on limited time-series data. Longer time
series data should provide a more accurate estimate of
the ECB’s rule with greater variation in the ECB’s response to economic shocks [3-5].
In this paper, we analyze the ECB interest-rate policy
and its responses to economic shocks, specifically to the
recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and the current sovereign debt crisis. We use the Euro Over-Night Index Average (EONIA) rate as a proxy for the ECB’s policy behaviour. The EONIA rate is the weighted average of inter-bank offer rates on inter-bank loans, which the ECB
ME
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controls. It is a benchmark rate for the unsecured money
market and it is the rate most closely linked to the repo
rate. We develop a forward-looking generalized method
of moments (GMM) model that we estimate using expectations data from the ECB, European Commission,
and The Economist. In particular, we examine whether
these two crises have affected the importance of several
macroeconomic variables in the ECB’s interest-rate setting.
Our main contributions to the literature are the examination of interest-rate setting following the financial and
sovereign-debt crises and identifying whether these two
crises induced structural breaks in ECB policy-making.
We analyze the possible effects of the crises in three distinct ways. First, we control for the financial crisis using
a general market sentiment indicator, the European “fear
index” VSTOXX. Second, we test for the impact of the
sovereign debt crisis on ECB interest-rate setting using
sovereign risk premia for Greece and Ireland. Finally, in
order to identify parameter shifts, we run a rolling estimation of our Taylor rule specification. Through this
visual exercise, we identify a possible shift occurring in
December 2008. We then test for this shift in ECB policy
by adding to our specification interaction terms with a
crisis dummy variable. We choose two starting points for
the crisis: December 2008 and August 2007 which
Trichet [1] describes as the beginning of the financial
turmoil.
We find that the EONIA moves with expected economic activity. In addition, regardless of whether we use
the expected inflation rate or consumer inflation expectations, the EONIA is not strongly associated with the inflation rate. This is in contrast to other papers that use the
3-month EURIBOR [6,7]. We argue that the 3-month
EURIBOR encompasses inflationary expectations (inflation risk) since it has a 3 month-term to maturity on inter-bank loans compared to the overnight inter-bank
loans rate (EONIA). To identify a structural break in the
data we run a recursive estimation on our model and find
a parameter shift in December 2008, not August 2007.
This result is consistent with the events unfolding in the
euro-area at the time. We also find that the EONIA rises
as Greek risk rises, reflecting perhaps an increase in
banks' liquidity preference. However, the EONIA falls as
Irish risk rises. We argue that our results reflect the underlying difference behind the debt crises for Greece and
Ireland. Given the focus of this paper, we do not examine
the ECB’s recent use of non-conventional monetary instruments to mitigate the effects of the financial and sovereign crises. However, as we proceed to argue, some of
these non-conventional ECB interventions are captured
by movements in the EONIA.
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we proCopyright © 2011 SciRes.

vide a brief perspective of contributions to this topic in
the U.S. and in Europe. In Section 3 we discuss our empirical methodology and data. Our results are reported in
Section 4. Finally, the last section summarizes and concludes.

2. Previous Work
2.1. Background on Interest Rate Rules
There has been a shift in empirical research towards policy rules describing central bank behavior, such as the
Taylor rule [8], specifically:







it  r  πt   π πt  π*t   y yt  yt*



(1)

where i is the target nominal interest rate, r is the real
equilibrium interest rate at full employment, π* is the
inflation target and y* is potential real GDP and  π ,  y
are positive parameters. Taylor postulated that r  π*t 
2 , and  π   y  0.5 . In fact, comparisons between the
interest rate predicted by Taylor’s rule mirrors the actual
federal funds rate for the 1987-1992 period.
Numerous additional studies have been generated modifying Taylor’s original monetary policy rule. Clarida,
Gali and Gertler [9] propose a forward-looking Taylor
rule by replacing the current inflation, rate, πt, with the
expected inflation rate 12 months ahead, Et[πt+12] (see
Equation (2) below). The key justifications for the forward-looking Taylor rule are the long and variable lags
in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.3







it  r  πt   π Et [πt 12 ]  π*t   y Et [ yt 12 ]  yt*



(2)

Orphanides [10] notes, however, that forecasts using
ex post or revised data would not yield the same estimates associated with data available to the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) at the time when policy is
decided. Instead, the FOMC uses Greenbook forecasts4
or real-time data5 to set the Federal Funds rate. Specifically, estimates derived using real-time data point to a
forward-looking rule as the correct specification and not
a backward looking rule.
In addition to modifications of the Taylor rule, the estimated coefficients’ reliability has been called into question. Central banks typically adjust interest rates in
smaller increments than implied by the rule.6 The debate
in the literature is whether the statistical significance of a
3

For a survey of the literature see the Journal of Economic Perspectives
symposium: Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (Fall 1995).
4
The Greenbook is produced before each meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee. Given assumptions on monetary policy, the Board
of Governors prepares projections on future economic activity.
5
Real-time data reflects, at each date (say May 2002), exactly what the
macroeconomic data looked like at that date, May 2002.
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lagged dependent variable in the policy rule is due to
“interest rate smoothing” or due to the central bank’s
response to serially correlated exogenous shocks [11].

2.2. Monetary Policy Rules and Central Bank
Behaviour in Europe
Monetary policy rules have also been estimated for European central banks. Prior to the introduction of the euro,
researchers estimated rules for national central banks in
the European Union (EU): some examined the effect of
Bundesbank policy on monetary policy in other European nations [12,13]; while others compiled “euro-area
data” using GDP weights for participating countries [5].
Following research developments on the Federal Reserve policy rule, the focus of research in Europe shifted
to developing forward-looking policy rules for the ECB
[3,4,6,13]. Most papers found that the nominal interest
rate rises by more than the increase in the inflation rate
(an inflation stabilizing policy), and that the output gap is
a significant factor in setting the short-term interest rate.
Further, in accordance with Orphanides [10], studies
estimating the ECB’s reaction function have used European real-time [5,6,14]. Consistent with Orphanides [10],
they find that estimates derived from ex post data provide
unrealistic or biased estimates of actual historical policy.
While many papers estimating a forward-looking rule
simply included a 12-month lead of inflation and of the
output gap in the policy rule, Gerlach [9,15] and Gorter
et al. [6] use 12-month expectations data for inflation
and output growth. For example, Gerlach [9] uses an
economic sentiment indicator (ESI) as the measure for
real economic activity because he notes that the ECB
Monthly Bulletins never mention an output gap but
rather business and consumer confidence.
Previous studies7 on European policy rules typically
use the European Over-Night Index Average (EONIA) as
the ECB’s indicator of monetary policy. This average
interest rate is calculated from banks participating in the
inter-bank euro-zone market (these maybe EU banks or
non-EU banks). Like the U.S. Federal Funds rate, this
interest rate is serves as a benchmark for other interest
rates. There are a few exceptions however. Carstensen
[16] and Gerlach [9] use the repo rate, the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate as their policy indicator8
and Gorter et al. [6] use the 3-month EURIBOR. The 36

This is perhaps due to minimized excessive volatility in short term
rates to encourage capital market stability and to raise central bank
credibility. During 2001, the Federal Reserve lowered the Federal
Funds Rate eleven times from 6.5% to 1.75%.
7
Such as Fendel and Frenkel [4], Sauer and Sturm [3], Belke and Klose
[15].
8
Since the repo rate is adjusted in increments of 25 basis points an
ordered probit or logit model is warranted.
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month EURIBOR is simply the inter-bank rate on interbank loans with a 3-month maturity.
There have been a few studies examining the effects of
the recent financial crisis on ECB policy. In most cases,
the empirical analysis of the crisis consists of identifying
the starting month of the financial crisis and to assess
whether the crisis induced a structural shift in the ECB
monetary policy rule. Gerlach [15] estimates an ordered
logit model and splits his sample in June 2008 to examine the shift in ECB policy during the financial crisis. He
finds that the ECB employed steep cuts in the repo rate
that were mostly due to a decline in economic activity
and a shift in the ECB’s reaction function. Gorter et al.
[7] split their sample June 1998-December 2007 and
June 1998-August 2010. They find no evidence of a shift
in policy and but find that the ECB focuses more on inflation in the post-crisis sample compared to the precrisis sample period. Belke and Klose [17] extend the
standard Taylor rule to include credit growth, yield curve,
and stock price inflation. They split their sample from
January 1999-January 2007 and August 2007-June 2009.9
They find that the ECB does react to changes in credit
growth and the yield curve during the post-crisis period
compared to the pre-crisis period. One drawback of their
analysis is the relatively short time period (23 observations) in the post-crisis sample.
To examine ECB behaviour during the crisis, we use a
different set of variables and methodologies that proxy
the developments of the financial and sovereign debt
crises. Furthermore, our sample extends from January
1999-May 2011 so we can better capture the on-going
developments in Greece and Ireland.

3. Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1. Empirical Methodology
Besides controlling for economic activity and inflation
developments, we augment the baseline Taylor rule
model with an interest-rate smoothing term [18] and
other economic variables which proxy the economic
shocks of the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis
which might affect the interest setting policy of the central bank.10

it   0 it 1   π Et [π t 12 ]   y Et [ yt 12 ]  X t x   t

[3]

where it is the EONIA. π t 12 , yt 12 , X t denote respectively the expected inflation rate, expected real economic activity, and other economic variables used to
9

They do not use data from February 2007 to July 2007 to distinguish
the pre-crisis sample from the post-crisis sample.
10
Castelnuovo [18] shows that the lagged interest rate in the euro area is
due to interest rate smoothing rather than omitted economic shocks.
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assess expectations about other economic and financial
developments.
We estimate our model using Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM). To check the validity of the GMM
estimation, we test the endogeneity of the instrumented
variables (if the test statistic is significant, the variables
being tested must be treated as endogenous). Our set of
instrumental variables for the expected inflation rate and
economic activity include lagged values of these two
variables (lag 2, t-2) which are known to the ECB at the
time monetary policy is decided. Additional lags of the
endogenous variables as instruments are redundant.11
In the empirical analysis that follows, we test for the
presence of unit roots in the data. We find that, although
the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected for all the
variables (with the exception of VSTOXX), it can however be explained in terms of structural breaks. We
therefore follow the convention adopted in the existing
literature and assume stationarity for all the variables
used in the estimations. Gorter et al. [6] also find evidence of non-stationarity and treat their variables as stationary, arguing that “from an economic point of view,
the arguments for stationarity are very strong, as there
has been a stable monetary regime in place with a fixed
inflation objective”. We do not run our model in first
differences, so our estimates are directly comparable to
previous work in the literature.

3.2. Data
We use monthly data spanning from January 1999 to
May 2011, but some of the series are only available until
February 2011 (see Table 1). Our dependent variable is
the EONIA. The EONIA rate is the weighted average of
inter-bank offer rates on inter-bank loans, which the ECB
controls. As shown in Figure 1, it is more closely linked
to the repo rate than the 3-month EURIBOR used in
other papers, and it signals the stance of monetary policy
in the euro-area [20]. While the EONIA is not directly
set by the ECB, the EONIA co-moves with the repo rate
during normal economic times. For example, before August 2007, the correlation coefficient between the repo
rate and the EONIA was 0.99. After May 2009 the correlation drops to 0.75. The ECB maintained the repo rate
at 1% between April 2009 and April 2011, i.e. during the
unfolding of the European sovereign debt crisis however,
the EONIA continued to fall well below 1% and began to
track the ECB deposit rate of 0.25% [21], thus causing
the correlation between the interest rates to drop. Despite
this drop in the correlation, we still believe the EONIA
remains a better proxy of the ECB’s interest rate policy
11

Excluded instruments are redundant if the asymptotic efficiency of
the estimation is not improved by using them (Baum et al., [19]).

Copyright © 2011 SciRes.

Figure 1. Interest rates in the Euro Area (changing composition), January 1999-June 2011. Source: elaboration on
data from ECB website.

than the repo rate. Using the repo rate to examine the
effects of the financial and sovereign debt crises on ECB
policy is problematic since the ECB does not alter this
rate while the crisis is developing. Instead, the ECB has
extended unlimited liquidity to banks in need of liquidity
to ensure the smooth functioning of financial system.
Consequently, the EONIA is a more useful indicator of
monetary policy and better captures the impact of the
ECB’s unlimited liquidity-provision on the money market. Figure 2 shows data on the EONIA and the monetary base for the euro-area. The graph shows the drop in
the EONIA, while the monetary base rises erratically
following the liquidity-provisions extended by the ECB.
Real-time, expectations data (the Economic Sentiment
Index and Consumer Confidence Indicator) are obtained
from two main sources: the ECB and the European
Commission. This is an experimental dataset constructed
to provide historical vintages of data published in the
Monthly Bulletin [22]. The dataset includes monthly data
available to the ECB on the working day preceding each
first monthly Governing Council’s meeting.12 Expected

Figure 2. EONIA and Monetary Base), January 1999-June
2011. Source: elaboration on data from ECB website.
ME
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Missing data

EONIA

149

2.66

1.30

0.34

5.06

Consumer confidence indicator

146

–11.25

7.71

–34.00

3.00

March-May 2011

Economic Sentiment Index

146

100.71

9.66

70.00

118.00

March-May 2011

Consumers' price expectations

144

16.24

10.81

–11.90

37.30

January-May 2011

Real time inflation rate

146

1.98

–0.79

0.65

4.05

March-May 2011

Expected Real GDP growth

150

1.66

1.04

–2.20

3.25

Expected Inflation rate

150

1.73

0.42

0.63

2.93

VSTOXX (12-months)

148

25.51

6.68

14.70

46.65

May-11

Greece risk premium

147

1.31

2.10

0.13

9.23

Jun-11

Ireland Risk Premium

147

0.66

1.27

–0.05

6.46

Jul-11

Source: elaboration on data from ECB website, the Economist, and IFS.

12-month inflation rate and real GDP growth rate data
are obtained from The Economist’s monthly poll of forecasters.
Most of the empirical literature on monetary-policy
reaction functions measures economic activity using the
output gap. However, using the output gap is problematic
for several reasons. First, national account data are released with a considerable lag, and are subject to numerous revisions. One solution is to use real-time data on
GDP to construct the output gap. However, as shown by
Orphanides and van Norden [23,24] output-gap estimates
in real-time do not yield more reliable estimates of the
central banks’ reaction function. Further, since GDP data
are not available on a monthly frequency, papers using
monthly data proxy GDP with industrial production13,
even though, industrial production tends to be very volatile and accounts for a fraction of economic activity in
Europe.
An alternative measure of economic activity often referred to in the ECB Monthly Bulletins [9] is survey data.
The econometric analysis presented and discussed below
uses three different measures of expected economic activity in the euro area, the Economic Sentiment Indicator
(ESI), Consumer Confidence Indicator, and expected real
GDP growth forecasts. The ESI is developed by the European Commission (available on the ECB website). It is
a composite indicator calculated as a weighted average
of indicators for consumers, the industry, service, construction, and retail trade sectors. The ESI reflects firms
and households’ opinions about the economy over the

next 12 months. A reading of the ESI above 100 indicates above average economic sentiment. We also check
the robustness of our results by using a Consumer Confidence Indicator obtained from the Consumer Survey
data of Eurostat. Our third measure of economic activity
is constructed14 from expected real GDP growth forecasts published in The Economist monthly poll of forecasters15. As shown in Figure 3, these three measures of
expected economic activity reached their lowest level in
March 2009.
To capture the forward-looking nature of monetary
policy, we construct a measure of expected (12 months
ahead) inflation based on The Economist’s polls of fore-

Figure 3. Economic Activity Forecast, January 1999-February 2011. Source: elaboration on data from ECB website
and The Economist.

12

The Governing Council meets twice a month, but monetary policy
decisions occur mostly during the first of the bi-monthly meeting of the
Council as it assesses the economic and monetary development in the
euro-zone.
13
Fourçans and Vranceanu, [25], Gerdesmeier and Roffia, [14], Heinemann and Huefner, [26].

Copyright © 2011 SciRes.
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See Gerlach [9] for details on how to construct the forecast series
based on the Economist polls of forecasters.
15
The ECB constructs its own Survey of Professional Forecasters.
However these data are only collected on a quarterly frequency, and are
therefore not appropriate for our analysis which relies on monthly data.
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casters (see Figure 4). Inflation is measured as the annual rate of change in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (headline HICP). We check the robustness
of our results by comparing our results using one component of the Eurostat Consumer survey which measures
consumers’ inflation expectations over the following 12
months. While previous studies use lead (t + 12) realtime output gap and inflation as proxies for expected
inflation, we believe the aforementioned expectations
data better captures the ECB’s goal in anchoring inflationary expectations.
Most of the aforementioned economic variables included in the specification are standard in the literature.
However, our primary focus is to examine the ECB’s
decision-making following the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and the 2009-2011 sovereign-debt crisis. While
the ECB may not directly respond to our crisis proxies,
these variables capture the unfolding crisis which could
affect financial market instability, and this instability
would concern the ECB outlined by the “second pillar”
of its monetary policy analysis. It is natural for the ECB
to respond to unforeseen shocks, and the inclusion of our
crisis variables captures some of these shocks. One
measure of general financial market sentiment is the
volatility index, VSTOXX. The VSTOXX indices are
based on the EURO STOXX 50 real-time options prices.
VSTOXX reflects market expectations of near-to-longterm volatility by measuring the square root of the implied variance across all (12 month) put and call options.16 Market volatility tends to rise during times of
financial stress. This index is sometimes called the “investor fear index” and higher values indicate greater uncertainty in the stock market as investors hedge against
losses. Figure 5 shows the index spikes in 2003 and
2009. The rise in the index from 2002-2003 reflects mar-

Figure 5. Dow Jones Euro STOXX50 Volatility Index: January 1999-February 2011. Source: elaboration on data from
STOXX. com.

Figure 4. Annual inflation rate in the Euro Area (changing
composition), January 1999-February 2011. Source: elaboration on data from ECB website.

ket uncertainty due to sluggish economic growth and
uncertainty arising the global war on terror, while the
rise during 2009 reflects uncertainty due to turmoil following the sub-prime financial crisis and sovereign debt
crisis. We would expect the EONIA to be negatively
associated with the VSTOXX, since a higher VSTOXX
index points to investors hedging against future stock
losses and uncertainty which is likely to occur during an
economic downturn.17
To capture the recent 2009-2011 sovereign debt crisis,
we include a sovereign debt risk premium for Greece and
Ireland. Our risk premium variable is the interest-spread,
calculated as the difference in yields between the 10-year
government bond in Greece and Ireland and Germany’s
(default free) 10-year government bond. Gorter et al. [6]
also include a risk premium to capture overall financial
market risk in the euro area. Their risk is measured by
long term corporate BBB Bonds minus the 10 year
euro-area government bond. So their interest-spread does
not capture sovereign risk, but rather corporate risk. A
rise in the risk premium on sovereign bonds is often associated with rising fiscal imbalances and may indicate
an increase in perceived default risk. A rising sovereign
bond yield can also occur if there is a decline in economic activity which causes a deterioration in the government’s fiscal situation, or if there is a global financial
crisis resulting in uncertainty, causing investors to seek
safer, higher quality bonds (such as German or U.S.
bonds). As shown in Figure 6 below, Greece’s risk premium declined significantly following the introduction
of the euro in 1999 and its adoption of the euro 2 years
later. After remaining quite low throughout the 2000’s,
the countries’ risk premia surged again in 2008 and
2009-2010, as the global crisis and recession worsened

16

17

We choose 12 month contracts for consistency since our other independent variables are 12 month expectations.

Copyright © 2011 SciRes.

Gerdesmeier and Roffia [5] include a stock price index in their specification, the DJ Euro Stoxx 50 to capture movements in asset prices.
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Figure 6. Countries’ Risk Premia: January 1999-February
2011. Source: elaboration on data from ECB website and IFS.
N.B. Interest Rate Spread between Countries and German 10
yr Bonds.

their debt situation. Even though Greek and Irish GDP
are a small percentage of the entire euro-area GDP, the
effects of the debt crisis in these countries have serious
consequences for euro-area financial stability. According
to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Union (EU) banks had $ 188 billion at risk in 2010
from periphery country debt (Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, Italy). Further, many EU banks lack sufficient
capital to buffer losses from a Greek or Irish default.18
Clearly the ECB is concerned about the Greek sovereign
debt crisis since the ECB has absorbed more than € 45
billion in Greek government bonds.19
One can consider several alternative proxies for the
sovereign debt crisis, but, as we argue below, our risk
premium measure is superior. First, one could include a
dummy for the announcement of the EU bailout. However, it is clear that Greece and Ireland were experiencing difficulties long before the bailouts, which were received respectively in May 2010 and November 2010.
Alternatively, one could use credit ratings for country
risk (such as Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s), but there
have been episodes when credit rating agencies failed to
down-grade sovereign bonds even though default risk or
country specific risk was rising.20 Another alternative to
the risk premium is the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, this
series is only available on a quarterly basis.

4. Results
4.1. Baseline Model
In this section, we present the results of the estimations
18

Bloomberg Business Week “EU Banks’ Capital Deficit Means Greek
Default Not an Option”, June 15, 2011.
Der Spiegel “ECB’s Balance Sheet Contains Massive Risks”, May 24,
2011
19
New York Times, “Spain and Italy Turn Against Greece Over Reform
Efforts”, May 23, 2011.
20
An example is the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
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of the ECB policy rule described in Section 3. Table 2
reports the results using the entire sample period from
January 1999 to May 2011 (or February 2011 depending
on the specification). The table contains 3 different
model estimations depending on different measures of
expected inflation and economic activity. The regression
results for the baseline model are reported in columns 1,
4 and 7 of Table 2. In the other columns of the tables,
the baseline model is augmented with an interest smoothing term, the lagged EONIA variable (columns 2,
5 and 8) and then with other variables capturing the recent financial and sovereign debt crises (columns 3, 6
and 9).
As indicated earlier, the Governing Council generally
discusses monetary policy at its first monthly meeting
(e.g. January 14 2010), and thus does not have access to
most of the data described in the previous section (with
the exception of the data obtained from the ECB realtime data set) for the month of this particular meeting
(e.g. data for January 2010). To reflect this data constraint, we use the one-month lag of the regressors. Often,
the inclusion of a risk premium in a policy rule can raise
concern of endogeniety. However, we do not believe we
have an endogeniety problem in this case as a change in
the EONIA rate would affect both the German and Greek
yields simultaneously and its effect on the difference
between the yields will be minimal.
Starting with the baseline model in columns 1, 4, and
7 in Table 2, we find one robust result, the EONIA is
positively related to higher economic activity, regardless
of our measure of economic activity (expected growth
rate, ESI, or consumer confidence) and the parameters
are statistically significant. We also find that the EONIA
is positively associated with the expected inflation rate
regardless of which measure we use (the expected inflation rate or consumer price expectations shown in columns 1 and 4). Once we include the interest smoothing
term (the lagged EONIA), we find a one percentage
point increase in the expected growth rate of real GDP is
associated with a 10 basis-point increase in EONIA
(columns 2 and 3) and when we use the ESI as our
measure of expected economic activity, a 100 basis-point
increase in the ESI (or consumer confidence) is associated with a 15 basis-point increase in EONIA (columns 5
and 8).
While the positive relationship between the EONIA
and economic activity persists when we include an interest smoothing term (lagged EONIA), the statistical significance of the coefficient on expected inflation disappears. This result holds regardless of which inflation
measure we use, The Economist’s expected inflation rate
or the survey on consumer price expectations (see columns 2 and 8). As pointed out in Gerlach [9,10], the lack
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Table 2. GMM regression results using real time and expectation data.
VARIABLES

(1)

Lagged EONIA

(2)
0.954

(3)
***

0.970

(4)
***

[0.013]

[0.019]

(5)
0.957

(6)
***

0.909

(7)
***

[0.015]

[0.027]

0.023***

0.013***

0.015***

[0.007]

[0.002]

[0.002]

(8)

(9)
***

0.898***

[0.016]

[0.031]

0.941

Expected Economic Activity
1) Lagged Expected

0.536***

0.105***

0.094***

GDP growth

[0.087]

[0.021]

[0.022]

2) Lagged ESI
3) Lagged Consumer Conf.

0.050***

0.016***

0.015***

Indicator

[0.012]

[0.003]

[0.003]

Expected inflation rate
1) Lagged Expected

1.526***

–0.033

–0.086

Inflation rate

[0.167]

[0.060]

[0.064]

2) Lagged Consumers'

0.081***

–0.001

0.003

0.071***

0.000

0.004

expected inflation

[0.008]

[0.002]

[0.003]

[0.009]

[0.002]

[0.003]

Lagged ln(VSTOXX)
Lagged Greece risk premium

–0.014

–0.129*

[0.075]

[0.065]

[0.066]

–0.020

Lagged Ireland risk premium
Constant

–0.258***

–0.060

***

–0.041*
[0.022]

[0.020]

[0.022]

0.054

0.062*

0.034

[0.033]

[0.034]

[0.033]

–0.876**

–0.009

0.874***

–0.955

–1.231***

–1.216***

2.111***

0.317***

0.810***

[0.365]

[0.075]

[0.293]

[0.668]

[0.194]

[0.346]

[0.249]

[0.075]

[0.181]

Observations

147

147

146

143

143

143

143

143

143

R-squared

0.530

0.987

0.988

0.534

0.989

0.990

0.577

0.988

0.989

Partial first-stage R2 (econ activity):

0.966

0.950

0.915

0.972

0.969

0.927

0.964

0.948

0.913

Partial first-stage R2 (inflation):

0.917

0.865

0.852

0.908

0.818

0.644

0.907

0.817

0.645

Endogeneity test:

122.639

31.433

18.973

371.610

43.501

34.338

450.954

30.402

22.698

Chi-sq(2) P-val =

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

AIC

390.19

–134.67

–143.38

374.58

–162.92

–168.34

360.54

–141.87

–153.30

Robust standard errors in brackets
***

p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Source: elaboration on data from ECB website, the Economist, and IFS.

of statistical significance of expected inflation might
stem from collinearity between economic activity and
inflationary developments (0.38 in our sample) as the
latter are often demand driven and are therefore captured
by increasing economic activity. Alternatively, the ECB
may view price developments as temporary and do not
respond by raising the EONIA. More likely, the insignificance might be due to the strong collinearity between
the lagged EONIA and our inflation measures (the correlation is 0.68 with the Economist inflation forecast, and
0.64 with the Consumers’ survey inflation expectations).
Gorter et al. [6,7] find a positive and statistically significant association between the 3-month EURIBOR and
Consensus Economics’ expected inflation rate even with
the inclusion of an interest smoothing term. There are
Copyright © 2011 SciRes.

two possible explanations for the difference in our results.
First we use two different datasets, Gorter et al. data are
obtained from Consensus Economics. Second, they use a
different interest rate as their monetary policy instrument,
the 3-month EURIBOR, which embodies term to maturity and would reflect changes in inflationary expectations
(inflation risk) compared to an overnight rate such as the
EONIA.
Finally, turning to our variables capturing the recent
financial and sovereign debt crises, their inclusion in our
specification clearly improves the model, as indicated by
the lowest AIC obtained in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table
2. Our measure of general financial market sentiment,
VSTOXX (the investor “fear” index), is negatively related to EONIA. As shown in column 3, a 1% increase in
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the VSTOXX index is associated with a 26 basis-point
decrease in the EONIA. An increase in Greece’s risk
premium is also negatively related to the EONIA: a 100
basis-point increase in Greece’s risk premium is associated with a 4 to 6 basis-point decrease in EONIA. One
possible explanation for the negative partial-correlation
is the ECB’s “credit enhancement program” causing the
EONIA to fall as Greek risk rises. The small coefficient
could be the non-conventional measures the ECB has
undertaken to mitigate the effects of the debt crisis. As
mentioned previously, the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) have accepted Greek, Irish, Portuguese
and Spanish government securities as collateral.21 We do
not find any robust relationship between the Irish risk
premium and the EONIA.

4.2. Did the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises
Induce a Policy Shift? Stability Analysis
4.2.1. Recursive Estimations
To test the stability of the estimated coefficients over
time, and to assess more accurately whether the financial
and sovereign debt crises induced a shift in the ECB’s
monetary policy, we first run recursive estimations of
Equation (3). A rolling regression estimates a particular
relationship (in our case, the Taylor rule) over many different sample periods. Each regression produces a set of
estimated coefficients.22 Recursive estimations thus trace
the evolution of the coefficients as the sample data increases by one additional observation for each estimation.
Consequently, the rolling regression technique allows a
visual assessment of coefficient stability and to identify
when a structural break might occur before testing for the
presence of a structural break more carefully using a
Chow test. If the relationship is stable over time, then the
estimated coefficients should be relatively similar from
one regression to the next. Variations in the relationship
will appear as sizable movements in the estimated coefficients.23 The starting period (January 1999) is held
fixed, and the sample window size grows by one month
for each estimation. If we choose a window of 48 months
for instance, the first estimation uses data spanning from
January 1999 to December 2002; the second estimation
would be based on data spanning from January 1999 to
21

Der Spiegel, “ECB’s Balance Sheet Contains Massive Risks: The
Hidden Cost of Saving the Euro” by M. Brendel and C. Pauly May 24,
2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,764299,00.html
22
While rolling regression can be used with time series data (as in this
paper), it can also be used with cross-section data to identify threshold(s
in the relationship between two variables. (See Rousseau and Wachtel
[27] for instance).
23
Aizenman and Glick [28] for instance, use the rolling estimation technique to test the stability of the sterilization coefficient, while Knotek.
[29] uses the same technique to check the stability of the Okun’s Law in
the USA between 1948 and 2007.
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January 2003, while the last estimation would cover the
entire time period (from January 1999 to February 2011).
We run GMM estimations of Equation (3), based on the
specification with the lowest AIC in Table 2 (column 6)
and record the estimated coefficients obtained for each
subsample. In order to allow enough observations to run
the first set of estimations, the recursive estimates are
obtained using a 48 months (4 years) window. The results discussed below are robust to a change in the window size (12 to 72 months) and to different measures of
expected inflation rate and expected economic activity.
Figure 7 presents a plot of the coefficients obtained recursively.24 The plots of the recursive estimates show
some visible changes in the estimated coefficients within
the sample period, largely associated with different episodes of financial and sovereign debt crises:

Overall the estimated coefficient on the lagged
EONIA is quite stable. However, a shift is noticeable around December 2008 as the coefficient and
error bands move from 0.8 to 0.9.

The estimated coefficient on expected inflation is
also quite stable, and is statistically significant different from zero between December 2006 and November 2010, consistent with Gorter et al. (2010)
that the ECB has focused more on inflation from
the onset of the crisis.

The estimated coefficient on expected economic
activity exhibits a slight downward trend, with a
sharp decrease occurring between November and
December 2010 as the debt crisis deepens. However,
this coefficient is stable at 0.02.

The estimated coefficients on Greece’s and Ireland’s risk premium variables all display a clear
shift (more pronounced for Ireland’s risk premium)
in December 2008 as the coefficient and error
bands shift from –0.2 to –0.1 and 1 to 0.2 respectively. The coefficient on the Greek risk premium
exhibits a clear uptrend after December 2008, possibly reflecting growing concerns at the ECB about
Greece’s fiscal health.
While August 2007 is generally considered the beginning of the recent financial crisis,25 our coefficients
clearly shift around December 2008. There are several
events that explain the structural break in 2008. First,
euro-area quarterly growth rates in GDP did not turn
The dates refer to the end-point of the estimation window.
25
In an interview with the Financial Times on December 15, 2008,
Jean-Claude Trichet dates the start of the financial crisis in Europe as
August 9, 2007, when the French bank BNP Paribas suspended all
withdrawals from funds backed by mortgage-backed securities by
investors after the US subprime mortgage crisis had led to a liquidity
shortage. Also see, Hubbard G., A. O’Brien, M. Rafferty, 2011. “ISMP: A Short Run Macroeconomic Model” in Macroeconomics, 1/E,
Chapter 9, p. 325. Prentice Hall Press. Also, Beirne [21].
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Figure 7. Recursive Estimation Coefficients. Source: elaboration on data from ECB website, the Economist, and IFS.

negative until the last quarter of 2008.26 Second, responding to the new recession, the ECB cut the repo rate
by 75 basis-points in December 2008, which triggered a
decline in the EONIA. This cut was larger than analysts
had anticipated and followed two, 50 basis-point cuts in
November and October respectively.27 The repo rate (and
consequently the EONIA) experienced its sharpest decrease between October and December 2008. This interest rate cut was followed a few days later (December 15,
2008) by a press release entitled “Financial Stability Review December 2008: Risks and vulnerabilities in financial system persist”.28 August 2007 does not correspond
to a structural break in our data because the financial
crisis which erupted then in the U.S. only spread to
Europe in the second half of 2008. The initial decline in
the repo rate and EONIA between September and December 2008 was largely driven by a decline in economic activity and not a policy shift [7].
4.2.2. GMM Estimation with Crisis Interaction Terms
To assess more precisely whether the 2007-2009 financial crisis and/or the more recent sovereign debt crisis
26

European Commission, “Economic Crisis in Europe: Cause, Consequences and Reponses” European Economy 7/2009 available at http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf
27
Der Spiegel, “European Interest Rates Tumble” 12/4/2008 available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,594485,00.html
28
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr081215.en.html
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induced structural shifts in the policy reaction function,
we run the same analysis as the one presented in Table 2
but including interaction terms with a time dummy variable capturing the period during financial and debt crises
in Europe. Statistically significant coefficients on these
interaction terms would indicate that the ECB’s response
to the variables interacted with the crisis dummy has
been changed by the crises. To test for a more general
policy shift, we run a joint test on all the interaction
terms (Chow test). We compare results obtained with
two different starting months: August 2007, generally
considered as the beginning of the financial crisis (see
footnote 25), and December 2008. The results are presented in Table 3.
First, there is no robust evidence that the financial crisis affected the interest-rate smoothing parameter, since
the coefficient on the interaction term between the lagged
EONIA and the time dummy variable is statistically insignificant in all specifications. There is more evidence
of a shift after December 2008, as the overall correlation
between current and lagged EONIA drops, capturing the
rapid decrease in the interest rate that occurred between
October and December 2008.
Second, the negative coefficients on the interaction
terms with our expected economic activity measures imply that the ECB was less likely to raise its interest rate
as economic activity rises during the crisis period (see
ME
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Table 3. Has the financial crisis affected the ECB’s interest rate setting?

Time of shift

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Aug. 2007

Aug. 2007

Aug. 2007

Aug. 2007

Dec. 2008

Dec. 2008

Dec. 2008

0.932***
[0.035]
0.032
[0.056]

0.919***
[0.029]
0.058
[0.036]

0.838***
[0.037]
0.087
[0.075]

0.915***
[0.024]
–0.271**
[0.114]

0.909***
[0.028]
–0.227***
[0.066]

0.839***
[0.037]
–0.132
[0.097]

0.013***
[0.002]
–0.016***
[0.005]

0.020***
[0.003]
–0.024***
[0.005]

0.932***
[0.026]
Crisis*Lagged EONIA
0.057
[0.037]
Expected Economic Activity
1) Lagged Expected
0.141***
GDP growth
[0.037]
Crisis (Lagged Expected
–0.011
GDP growth
[0.056]
2) Lagged ESI
Lagged EONIA

0.151***
[0.043]
–0.178***
[0.061]
0.014***
[0.002]
0.002
[0.005]

Crisis*Lagged ESI
Expected inflation rate
1) Lagged Expected
0.119
[0.079]
Inflation rate
Crisis*Lagged Exp. Inflation
–0.294**
[0.142]
2) Lagged Consumers’
expected inflation
Crisis*Lagged Consumers’
expected inflation
Crisis time dummy
0.426**
[0.192]
Lagged ln (VSTOXX)

Observations
R-squared
Partial first-stage R2 (econ activity):
Partial first-stage R2 (inflation):
Endogeneity test
Chi-sq(2) P-val =
AIC
Chow test
[p-value]
Robust standard errors in brackets
***
p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

0.020***
[0.003]
–0.021***
[0.006]
0.138*
[0.070]
0.113
[0.315]

–0.024
[0.175]
–0.010
[0.219]

–0.281*
[0.149]

0.899**
[0.370]
–0.193**
[0.082]
–0.026***
[0.007]
–0.090
[0.070]
0.127*
[0.071]
0.326
[0.216]
–0.362
[0.220]
0.562
[0.434]

–1.209***
[0.204]

0.005*
[0.003]
–0.002
[0.008]
2.628***
[0.758]
–0.006
[0.071]
–0.028***
[0.009]
–0.175***
[0.022]
0.186***
[0.043]
0.754***
[0.157]
–0.766***
[0.163]
–1.612***
[0.360]

147
0.988
0.941
0.842
35.039
0.000
–133.211
1.79
[0.153]

146
0.991
0.867
0.746
15.219
0.004
–161.069
4.18
[0.000]

143
0.990
0.969
0.830
62.979
0.000
–158.850
1.29
[0.282]

143
0.992
0.922
0.662
60.809
0.000
–186.361
6.61
[0.000]

Crisis*Lagged VSTOXX
Lagged Greece risk
Premium
Crisis*lagged Greece
Risk Premium
Lagged Ireland risk
Premium
Crisis*lagged Ireland
Risk Premium
Constant

0.179***
[0.037]
–0.211**
[0.085]

0.003
[0.003]
–0.008
[0.005]
–0.242
[0.460]

0.223
[0.320]

0.005*
[0.003]
0.001
[0.005]
1.525***
[0.455]

–0.342***
[0.127]

–1.180***
[0.217]

0.006**
[0.003]
–0.001
[0.008]
2.242***
[0.573]
0.010
[0.073]
–0.005
[0.008]
–0.163***
[0.028]
0.174***
[0.044]
0.555**
[0.270]
–0.567**
[0.273]
–1.675***
[0.386]

147
0.991
0.951
0.897
29.313
0.000
–175.769
6.90
[0.000]

143
0.991
0.966
0.816
41.923
0.000
–179.643
6.57
[0.000]

143
0.992
0.920
0.646
60.587
0.000
–190.966
6.74
[0.000]

Source: elaboration on data from ECB website, the Economist, and IFS.
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the downward trend in the ESI in Figure 7). The net partial-correlation coefficient between the two variables is
negative during the crisis. We now find a statistically
significant, positive relationship between expected inflation and EONIA (see column 5 in Table 3). A one percentage-point increase in the expected inflation rate is
associated with a 14 basis-point increase in EONIA. This
result is consistent with Gorter et al. [7] which find that
the ECB focuses on inflation more during the crisis period.
The negative relationship between the financial market
volatility index (VSTOXX) and EONIA persists only
when the crisis is measured as starting in August 2007.
Once we use December 2008 as the start of the crisis,
VSTOXX is no longer significant. Clearly, the dummy
variables following December 2008 capture most the
effects of the negative financial market sentiment and
VSTOXX adds no additional information.
Instead of the EONIA falling when Greece and Ireland’s risk premia rise during the crisis-period, we find
that the EONIA rises when the Greek risk premium rises
and falls when the Irish risk premium rises. Further, the
magnitude of the coefficients is much smaller during the
crisis period. One reason for the smaller coefficient during the crisis period is the ESCB’s acceptance of sovereign debt as collateral from EU banks during this period.
This policy prevents bond spreads from rising too rapidly
(see footnote 26) even though the debt has little value. In
addition, the different coefficient signs for Greek risk
and Irish risk are the reason behind their respective sovereign debt problems. Greece’s problems stem from imprudent fiscal policy over several years, while Ireland's
debt problems arise from bank bailouts during the subprime crisis. The EONIA is a market rate influenced by
the ECB; however, the EONIA is also determined by the
banking system’s supply and demand for liquidity (Schianchi and Verga [30], Soares and Rodrigues [31]). If
banks are uncertain about future liquidity, or lack thereof,
banks will demand more liquidity in the inter-bank market thereby raising the EONIA. EU banks have more
exposure to Greek government debt compared to Irish
government debt and so the precautionary demand for
liquidity is higher.29 So as the Greek debt crisis (measured by the Greek risk premium) unfolds, the EONIA
rises (a positive coefficient) compared to Ireland (a negative coefficient).
Before we control for the policy shift (our time dummies), the coefficient signs on Greek and Irish risk were
negative (–0.06) and positive (0.062) respectively, see
column 6 of Table 2 (the estimation with the lowest
29

Financial Times, “Hot stuff in European banks’ exposure” by John
McDermott, June 21, 2011. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/06/21/
601491/hot-stuff-in-european-banks-exposure/
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AIC). Once we control for the policy shift, the signs on
the net partial-correlation coefficients reverse (see column 7 in Table 3 with the lowest AIC). For Greece, the
net partial-correlation is –0.163 + 0.174 = 0.011 and for
Ireland the net partial correlation is 0.555 – 0.567 =
–0.012. Clearly, the effect of the policy shift (captured
by the dummy variables) overwhelms effect on the baseline response of the EONIA to the risk premiums. The
sizes of the coefficients suggest that the economic effect
is small.
Finally, based on the joint F-test (Chow test), we find
more evidence of a general shift in the ECB’s policy
following December 2008 in contrast to the usual date of
August 2007.

5. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the co-movement in the EONIA to
the financial and sovereign debt crises using expectations
data. As our baseline, we estimate a forward-looking
Taylor rule with a smoothing parameter. One clear result
is that the ECB heavily weights economic sentiment.
However, we cannot ascertain whether the ECB is only
responding to changes in expected economic activity, or
whether the increases capture inflationary pressures.
Once we control for interest smoothing, the EONIA is
not significantly associated with inflation. This result is
robust using different types of inflation data. We augment our baseline model to include variables that proxy
the financial and sovereign debt crises. Our measure of
general financial market sentiment is the (investor “fear”
index, VSTOXX. We find that the VSTOXX coefficient
is statistically significant and negatively associated with
the EONIA. However, once we account for a policy shift,
VSTOXX is no longer significant. We conclude that
VSTOXX is capturing the shift in monetary policy. Our
variables to proxy developments in the sovereign debt
crisis, the risk premia on Greek and Irish government
bonds over German government bonds, are significant
even when we account for the monetary policy shift, but
have a smaller magnitude. Finally, we establish a clear
shift in policy in December 2008 in contrast to the conventional start of the crisis in August 2007.
The ECB is often criticized for being unclear on policy
changes. Since the ECB does not publicly release minutes to policy meetings, markets are often left wondering
the direction of future policy and how the ECB arrives at
its decisions. Our paper provides some insight into ECB
behaviour and movements in the EONIA following the
recent financial and sovereign debt crises. To further
clarify how the ECB arrives at its policy decisions, we
plan to investigate how national economic considerations
affect ECB policy, and whether the recent financial and
ME

F. BOUVET ET AL.

sovereign debt crises have affected the weights placed on
different countries’ economic outcomes.
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Data Appendix
Variable definitions:

EONIA: Euro OverNight Average Index, shortterm interest rate.

Expected headline inflation: 2 different measures.
o Forecast of annual growth rate in the Harmonized
Index of Consumer Prices from the Economist poll
of forecasters.
o Consumers’ inflation expectations: consumer survey question on Price trends over the next 12
months (Eurostat). This is also an adjustment indicator.

Expected Economic Activity: 3 different measures:
o Real time economic sentiment indicator (ECB).
o Real time consumer confidence indicator (ECB):
this is an adjustment indicator.
o The real GDP growth rate forecast from the Economist poll of forecasters.

Country Risk Premium: difference between the
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long-term (10 year) government bond yields of
Greece or Ireland and Germany (IFS).
Sample:

January 1999 to May 2011 data for the euro Area.
The composition of the euro area changes with the
actual number of member countries:

Euro area changing composition:
Adoption in
o January 1999: Euro11 (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
o January 2001: Euro12 (Greece).
o January 2007: Euro 13 (Slovenia).
o January 2008 Euro 15 (Cyprus and Malta).
o January 2009: Euro 16 (Slovakia).
o January 2011: Euro 17 (Estonia).
Sources:
Data are obtained from the ECB website, IFS, The
Economist, and Eurostat.
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